Shared logins are a real workflow. Families share streaming accounts. Teams share vendor portals. The industry answered with productized sharing — often by letting the provider mediate access, re-encrypt for another user, or hold a copy in a form it can open. That is convenient. It is also hard to reconcile with a vault we cannot read.
Vault App encrypts items on your device. There is no server-side plaintext to “share safely.” Building sharing that feels magical usually means weakening zero-knowledge or inventing a complex key-exchange product that still changes who can decrypt what. We chose not to pretend otherwise.
Sharing vs. the sealed vault
End-to-end encryption means ciphertext leaves your device and only your keys open it. Introducing a second legitimate reader requires either giving them keys, decrypting for them on a server, or maintaining an escrow path. Each option expands the set of people and systems that can see the secret.
Once the server can orchestrate sharing, it is a short step to support tools, admin visibility, and recovery flows that depend on the same capability. The homepage can still say encrypted. The threat model has already moved.
A different product class
Organizations that need shared credentials often need shared accountability too: policy, revocation, and audit of who accessed what. That is closer to enterprise secrets management than a personal zero-knowledge vault. Collapsing both into one consumer feature list produces muddy guarantees.
Vault App is optimized for secrets only you should hold: your logins, notes, and cards behind a master password we never store. Activity history and MFA harden the account around that vault. They do not turn us into a sharing broker.
If you must share anyway
Do it through a channel you understand — briefly, intentionally, and with a plan to rotate the password afterward. Prefer unique generated credentials so sharing one login does not reuse a pattern across your life. Do not expect the vault that cannot open your items to magically open them for a colleague.
Saying no to sharing is not indifference to real workflows. It is fidelity to a security model. If a password manager offers one-click sharing and zero-knowledge in the same breath, ask how both can be true when the server is the middleman.