Protecting vault data is fundamental to how Vault App is designed. Passwords, secure notes, credit card information, and other vault items are encrypted on the device before they are transmitted or stored. The platform uses AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption and a zero-knowledge architecture so that only the account holder can unlock vault contents.
Many password managers extend into the browser through plugins that autofill credentials across the web. Vault App takes a different approach. The vault runs as a dedicated application surface—not as a browser extension that injects itself into every site visited.
That choice is deliberate. Browser extensions sit in a privileged position: they can read page content, intercept form fields, and become a high-value target when a store listing, update channel, or dependency is compromised. Autofill also trains users to trust prompts that appear on login pages—an attack surface phishing kits routinely exploit.
By keeping vault access inside a controlled application context, credential use stays intentional. Secrets are unlocked when needed, copied or applied deliberately, and never continuously exposed to the browser's broader execution environment.
Omitting a browser extension reduces the platform's attack surface and clarifies trust boundaries:
Convenience that requires injecting secrets into the browser is treated as a security tradeoff—not a default. Vault App favors explicit unlock, deliberate retrieval, and a smaller trusted computing base over ambient autofill across the open web.
Vault App is structured so cryptographic control stays with the account holder. Encryption and decryption happen on trusted devices. Master passwords and derived keys are not held by the network in a recoverable form. The infrastructure stores and synchronizes ciphertext; it does not hold the means to read it.
In that sense the vault is decentralized at the point that matters: authority over secrets. Availability and sync may rely on networked storage, but confidentiality does not. Compromising the transport or datastore yields encrypted blobs without the keys required to interpret them.
Sensitive vault data is encrypted locally on the device before leaving it. Encryption keys are derived from the master password and are never transmitted in a form that would allow anyone else to decrypt vault data.
Because encryption occurs before synchronization, data stored in the network remains unreadable without those keys.
The system is designed so that vault contents, master passwords, and encryption keys remain solely under the account holder's control.
Encryption and decryption occur exclusively on trusted devices. At no point does the network possess the information required to decrypt vault data.
The master password is the foundation of vault security.
Because the master password never leaves the account holder's control in a recoverable form, account recovery is not possible without methods previously configured by that account holder.
Encryption keys are derived from the master password using PBKDF2 and a unique cryptographic salt generated for each account.
Key derivation increases the computational cost of password-guessing attacks and helps protect encrypted data even if an attacker obtains a copy of the encrypted vault.
All vault data stored in the network remains encrypted.
Each encrypted field uses a unique initialization vector (IV), ensuring that identical values produce different ciphertext. This prevents pattern analysis and improves cryptographic strength.
The infrastructure employs strict access controls, encrypted communications, and continuous monitoring to protect stored data and system integrity.
Vault App does not continuously push credentials into third-party pages. Access is deliberate: unlock the vault, retrieve what is needed, and keep the session within the application boundary.
That model reduces silent exfiltration risk from malicious scripts on the open web and avoids normalizing credential entry through overlays that can be mimicked. Security here prefers clarity of action over invisible convenience.
Shared vaults and delegated credential access are intentionally unsupported. Each account retains exclusive control over its secrets, reducing lateral risk from shared links, team vaults, or forwarded access that outlive their intended purpose.
Account authentication can be strengthened with multi-factor authentication and trusted-device controls. These layers protect account access itself—separate from the cryptographic barrier that protects vault contents.
Even with account credentials compromised, vault items remain ciphertext without the master password and derived keys held on trusted devices.
Because vault data remains encrypted end to end, no one else has the information required to read stored secrets.
Security is an ongoing process. Architecture, threat models, updates, and cryptographic implementations continue to evolve as standards and risks change.
Strong security controls are maintained while preserving the privacy and confidentiality of vault data.
For security questions or to report a concern, contact support@vault0.app.
Vault data is protected with end-to-end encryption and a zero-knowledge architecture. Encryption keys are derived from the master password, which is never stored on the servers. Only the account holder has the information required to decrypt passwords, secure notes, or credit card information.
A zero-knowledge architecture ensures only the account holder can access vault data. Information is encrypted using keys derived from the master password before it is stored or synchronized. The system never has access to the master password or encryption keys, so vault contents cannot be viewed, accessed, or recovered by anyone else.
No. Vault data is encrypted before it is stored, and only the master password can decrypt it. Because of the zero-knowledge architecture, no one else can access, view, or recover the contents of a vault.
The master password is never stored or transmitted in a recoverable form. Only the account holder has access to it, so it cannot be reset or recovered. If it is lost, access to the encrypted vault cannot be restored.
Passwords, usernames, website addresses, secure notes, and credit card information — including cardholder names, card numbers, expiration dates, and CVV codes — can be stored securely. All vault data is protected using the same encryption and security architecture.
Password sharing is intentionally not supported. This design choice helps ensure each user maintains exclusive control over their credentials and sensitive information, reducing the risks associated with shared access.